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PIOTR STANEK* 
Theoretical Aspects of Collective Decision Making -  
Survey of the Economic Literature 
Abstract 
The article aims at surveying the economic literature related to collective 
decision making. In order to do so it proposes a coherent framework allowing 
for a structured analysis of the factors influencing the works of a committee. 
These factors are divided into external ( shaped outside of the committee e.g. by 
law) and internal ones (related to the composition of the committee and 
interactions between its members). The survey of the general economic 
literature related to collective decision making presented within the proposed 
framework yields interesting suggestions for further research, including the 
consequences for the shape of monetary policy committees.  
1. Introduction 
Since the decline of autocratic monarchies, more important state decisions 
are less often entrusted to individuals. This development is in line with the 
common knowledge that two heads are better than one, which was 
mathematically proven by Condorcet (1785) on the grounds of the then-
emerging probability theory. Even if his analysis concerned juridical decision-
making, one may assume that any important dilemma in human society could be 
delegated to a committee. 
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Indeed, it is frequently remarked on that laws are usually (at least in 
peacetime) made by parliaments, juridical cases are settled by courts, and 
authorities on virtually all governance levels are collective bodies. Even sport 
competitions are usually evaluated by several referees1. More economic 
examples include supervisory boards of enterprises, boards of directors, editorial 
boards of scientific journals, as well as diverse economic councils or ‘think 
tanks’, which may play a significant role even if they are only of a consultative 
character.  
The following section introduces a conceptual framework, allowing for an 
analysis of collective decision-making. It will be focused on the factors 
influencing the process and the efficiency of decision making, by dividing the 
factors into external and internal ones. These external and internal factors, in 
turn, will be covered in detail in sections 3 and 4. Most of the proposed factors 
are general enough to be investigated within a broad decision-making 
framework; others are specific to (or have been analyzed in depth with respect 
to) monetary policy making, and will be omitted as exceeding the scope of the 
present article. Further research steps, together with concluding remarks, are 
included in the final section.  
2. Conceptual framework 
In order to conceptualise the analysis of decision making in a committee 
and its determinants, a simple scheme is proposed: a committee obtains some 
information2 (possibly divergent or differently interpreted by different members) 
and reaches a decision through a collective decision-making process. However, 
two groups of factors may influence its work and outcomes. 
First, external determinants influence the committee and the process of 
reaching the decision. They represent structural and institutional characteristics 
shaped by laws regulating the framework of monetary policy making and 
include such elements as the organisational setup (number of committee 
members, decision-making rules, etc.), appointment process, and also possibly 
encompass external pressure (political pressure or “central bank bashing”3 being 
the most common examples). Second, internal features, including preferences of 
the committee members and diverse interactions among members, clearly exert 
an effect on the quality and character of the decision-making activity. It seems 
                                                 
1
 This particularly concerns qualitative judgments. 
2
 Information may be considered as an input to the decision-making process. 
3
 See e.g. Maier and Bezoen, 2004. 
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logical that the preferences of committee members are shaped by their personal 
experience and thus can be approximated by their demographic and social 
characteristics. At the same time, members' features (somehow aggregated) may 
be used to describe the committees themselves. This broad idea is visualised by 
Figure 1 below. 
The simplicity and clarity of the illustration requires an omission of some 
interactions among internal and external factors. For instance, personal 
characteristics of (potential) committee members obviously influence their 
eligibility and, theoretically, the optimal number of members is related to the 
voting rule (more on this below). 
Figure 1. Decision-making by a committee 
Source: own elaboration. 
Before turning to a deeper analysis of committees, a general rationale for 
group rather than individual decision-making will be presented and examined. 
Simple and intuitive reasons for leaving some important decisions to committees 
are that collegial decision-making allows for sharing experience, knowledge, as 
well as responsibility. Over two hundred years ago Condorcet (1785) argued that 
adding members to a jury increases the probability that the decision taken will 
be appropriate and that this probability tends to one as the number of jury 
members tends to infinity. This scope of research has continued, revealing that 
these findings are valid only upon fulfillment of fundamental premises, such as 
null cost of members' participation and information acquisition, sharing  
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a common objective, sincere and non-strategic voting, and no communication 
between committee members4. 
There are no general studies providing arguments for the superiority of 
collective decision-making in all contexts. In fact, within some domains (private 
spending being probably the most obvious example), individual decisions will 
be surely more efficient. However, as proved by Méon (2006), the decision 
making by committee (deciding by simple majority) stabilizes the potentially 
volatile preferences of its members. 
Nevertheless, where some important stakes emerge and/or when a high 
degree of uncertainty exists, mankind tends (as mentioned in the introduction) to 
rely on collective decision-making. Some more precise arguments, within the 
specific context of monetary policy, will be given below in section 2. For now, 
let us assume that Condorcet's theorem works for small committees in a majority 
of decision-making fields (two heads are always better than one).  
3. External factors 
Following the scheme visualized in Figure 1, the factors influencing 
collective decision-making and external to the committee itself will be 
presented. These aspects might be shaped by the law (as usually concerns the 
number of members, committee structure, and or decision-taking rules) or might 
involve some other forms of external pressure, which is, however, usually proper 
for some specific kinds of committees. According to the general approach to 
collective decision-making followed in this section, the focus will be on the two 
probably most important external features of the committee's functioning: 
number of members and decision-taking rules (hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as ‘the decision rule’). 
Number of members 
The first question to be raised after admitting the superiority of 
committees over individuals in decision-making is the optimal size of the 
committee. Condorcet's jury theorem suggesting infinitely inflating the 
committees as a way of assuring efficient decision-making seems both idealistic 
and unrealistic. Referenda, which might be thought of as its direct application, 
                                                 
4
 An interesting and pedagogical explanation of Condorcet's ideas as well as the alternative 
voting schemes are presented in Moulin (1988, chapters 9-11) while some more in-depth insights 
are provided e.g. by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Nevertheless, as will become clear below, 
this stream of literature lies only at the margin of the subject tackled in this article. 
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are not very commonly used (except, perhaps, in Switzerland5). The reason is 
relatively simple – in reality the costs related to increasing the number of voters 
are non-null, and the marginal (decisional) return – understood as the increase in 
the probability of taking the right decision implied by adding a decision-maker – 
is usually decreasing. This is especially the case especially when decisional 
skills are equally distributed among members. Thus, introducing a positive 
marginal cost of adding a member to the committee limits the optimal number of 
its members. This intuitive result has been demonstrated e.g. by Berk and Bierut 
(2003). 
Koriyama and Szentes (2009) confirmed that premise under a (reasonable) 
assumption of rapidly decreasing marginal value of an individual signal and an 
endogenous information acquisition. They show, however, that the losses 
generated by a committee which is too big are smaller than that of a committee 
which falls short of two members (as compared to the optimal size). This means 
that in the event of uncertainty about the optimal design of a committee, it is 
better (safer) to have too large a number of members than a too small a number 
of members.  
Another mechanism potentially influencing the behavior of committee 
members relies on career concerns and reputation-building, where experts must 
compete for an opportunity to speak (Hahn 2012). Under such a setup, in  
a committee which is too large members may be reluctant to reveal their 
information. This, in turn, strongly limits the optimal size of the committee. 
In reality, the above-mentioned costs of a bigger committee may take on  
a monetary form (e.g. salaries of the members or administration costs of their 
bureaus) or may be of a non-pecuniary nature. Berger (2002) has qualified the 
latter as "decision making costs" which might be understood as the time needed 
to improve the average accuracy of decisions. 
Restraining the number of voters (and time of discussion), while limiting 
the informational losses caused by lowering the number of members is possible 
through diverse decision-making schemes, such as rotation or grouping members 
in constituencies6. Bosman et al. (2005) led an interesting laboratory experiment 
investigating how rotation schemes influence outcomes. This research was (as 
the authors admit) influenced by the rotational system at the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC), but it seems that the adopted reform of the ECB 
(with its unequal rotation scheme) was an additional motivation. The authors 
                                                 
5
 For a deeper analysis of recent Swiss experience, see Kirchgässner (2007). 
6
 A description of the main decision-making schemes applicable to central banking  
is presented in Stanek (2004) while discussing diverse propositions for preparing decision making 
of the ECB for the enlargement of the euro area. 
108                                                                      Piotr Stanek                                                                
 
compared behavior and outcome of a five-person committee, whose members 
care about their individual pay-offs but also the common goal (which is itself  
a weighted average of personal rewards), under three decision-making schemes. 
In the first one all members are allowed to participate, the second is an "equal" 
rotation scheme, where only three members are allowed to vote and rotate with 
equal frequencies, and under the third scheme one member was granted  
a permanent seat and other four members rotated with a constant (50%) 
frequency. 
The main findings include the superiority of rotating (and thus smaller) 
committees in terms of speed of decision-making (and number of vetoes), at the 
cost of somewhat more frequent strategic voting behavior7. The rotation scheme 
marginally improved mean overall pay-off, however at the same time 
redistribution effects emerged (members earned more in rounds when they had 
voting rights). Thus, the pay-off variance also increased when the rotation 
scheme was applied. Interestingly, even if the applied decision rule was 
unanimity, the preferred outcome of the median voter was the result in about 
60% of decisions. 
Decision rule 
If larger committees are believed to spend an especially long time to agree 
on a decision, this can even be aggravated when they reach it by consensus 
rather than by simple majority voting. This indicates that the optimal size and 
decision-taking rule for a committee might be linked. 
These two imminent characteristics of the committee are modeled by 
Persico (2004), although the main focus is on the decision rule. He defines it 
(analogically to other related works) as the minimum number of votes required 
to validly adopt a decision. The designer, simultaneously with the decision rule, 
chooses the size of the committee. The optimal size is always bounded as the 
system designer, incurring a small cost (relatively to the social gain from  
a correct verdict) of adding a juror, always chooses the smallest committee 
leading to the optimal outcome (highest probability of taking a good decision). 
In his dual (convict-acquit) model Persico finds that the optimal decision 
rule, yielding the highest probability of taking a good decision while providing 
incentives for all members to acquire information (and to vote informatively) 
depends on the quality of information. More precisely, the fraction of members 
                                                 
7
 Strategic - in contrast to sincere or naïve - voting refers to the situation when a voter supports 
a different option that he or she would choose alone. The reasons for such a situation may be 
diverse, e.g. expectations of other members' behavior or the signals they revealed. Gerling et al. 
(2005), following Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) also distinguishes between naive voting and 
informative voting, when the committee member votes according the information she has. 
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required to convict the defendant is close to the probability, when a juror obtains 
a correct signal8. Thus, the unanimity rule is efficient only if information is 
nearly perfect. Moreover the author proves that it is always better to enlarge  
a committee of size n deciding by unanimity by two members (the new 
committee counts n + 2 members) and change the decision rule allowing one 
member to dissent (n + 1 votes are required to convict). 
One should note, however, that Persico's model does not allow for the 
exchange of information (or other form of interaction, learning etc.) between 
committee members. However, anecdotal evidence or minutes (where available) 
from prominent monetary policy committees (FOMC, ECB Governing Council, 
British Monetary Policy Committee, or Bank of Canada – see Macklem 2002) 
corroborate that meetings start usually with a "tour d' horizon" where all 
members present their views about the current economic situation. Nevertheless, 
these mechanisms are internal factors of decision making and thus will be 
analysed more deeply in the following section. 
However, one of Persico's (2004) most important findings, reflected in 
reality, is that the decision rule applied may critically influence the decisions of 
a committee. The most commonly analysed decision rules are simple majority 
and unanimity, even if (and because) they represent the two extremes9 of the 
entire spectrum of qualified majorities (often used in important decisions such as 
constitutional amendments etc.). However, these two decision rules are the most 
interesting from the theoretical point of view precisely because they are both 
relatively simple to model and represent border cases – any other plurality 
voting rule is by definition located between them. The practical importance of 
these rules is implied by their frequent application in the setup of MPCs: de jure 
supremacy of a simple majority rule, and possible de facto use of unanimity in 
the ECB10. 
                                                 
8
 These probabilities are supposedly equal for all jurors. Later, the author introduces 
heterogeneity into the committee, but it concerns members' disutilities of two types of errors and 
the cost of information acquisition. Persico (2004) finds that restricting to one type of juror can 
only improve the outcome. 
9
 It has to be mentioned that the possibility of adopting (less important) decisions even without 
the consent of any kind of majority has also been analyzed. See Erlenmeter and Gersbach (2001). 
It seems, however, that in monetary policy such flexible majority rules, possibly allowing for 
minor interest rate changes with support from only a minority of voters, are not feasible in 
practice. To realize the possible negative consequences, consider a case where there are two 
minorities who want a minor change, but in opposite directions. Moreover, such minorities 
desiring opposite changes, which would probably cancel each other out during one meeting, might 
emerge in two consecutive meetings, which would lead to an undesirable interest rate volatility. 
10
 Wim Duisenberg and Jean-Claude Trichet in their press conferences always claim that the 
decision taken by the Governing Council was consensual. 
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Gerling et al. (2005), in their game theoretic survey, alleviate the 
(unrealistic) Condorcet's hypothesis and analyze committee decision making 
from the perspective of information acquisition. They show that unanimity is an 
optimal decision rule only if some important requirements are met, i.e. if the 
committee has perfect information at its disposal and shares a common 
objective. In fact, these two condition make the exact decision rule unimportant. 
However, when these premises are not fulfilled, the unanimity rule has some 
undesired features. In general, when strategic voting is a plausible possibility, 
the unanimity rule, which gives a veto power to every voter, may lead to biased 
committee decisions even if the number of its members tends to infinity. This 
socially suboptimal outcome results from the fact that every member’s vote is 
pivotal, which involves some kind of herding behavior: if all jury members 
convict – the last one will convict also, even if her own signal suggests the 
contrary11. 
In spite of this argument, unanimous (or consensual) decisions are 
believed to work in environments where the first type error is costly (e.g. 
convicting an innocent person). Thus, the unanimity rule is applied to some 
important decisions, especially in the international context – it applies within 
some multilateral negotiations such as WTO and some important issues within 
the European Union, but also in American penal juries12. 
Situated at the other end of the majorities required to adopt decisions is 
the simple majority rule. Though having been applied to public decisions since 
at least Athenian democracy and subjected to scientific analysis since at least 
Condorcet (1785), its simplicity was re-interpreted in terms of the median voter 
theorem only in the mid 20th century by Black (1948). Its weak form states that 
the alternative which wins in elections guided by majority rule is always 
supported by the median voter, while its strong form says that the median voter 
always obtains his or her most preferred policy. This means that any committee 
decision taken by simple majority can be (accurately) proxied by the preferences 
of the median voter, which are usually easier to obtain. 
The applicability of the median voter theorem, however, crucially depends 
on the existence of the median voter, which is, in turn, is contingent on the type 
of individual preferences. Some problems arise when available options are not 
quantifiable. A simple example is often given with three voters (A, B, C) and 
three alternatives (x, y, z): If A prefers x to y to z, B prefers y to z to x and C – z 
                                                 
11
 See e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999). 
12
 Feddersen's and Pesendorfer's (1999) results have been contested, at least with respect to 
juries, by Coughlan (2000). 
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to x to y, there is no median voter nor optimal (stable) outcome13. However, if 
voter preferences are single peaked (in the case of one-dimensional spaces) the 
median voter exists14. This is arguably the case in monetary policy, where the 
policy maker probably has his or her preferred interest rate and is more 
displeased the more the rate set deviates from this optimal value. In the case of 
two dimensions, the existence of the median voter requires strongly symmetrical 
preferences. Nevertheless, it has been shown that a dominant part of political 
questions can be transposed to one-dimensional spaces (Poole and Daniels, 
1985). Moreover, the median voter theorem has been also generalised to multi-
dimensional spaces15. 
To overcome the problems linked to unanimous voting while still assuring 
a greater probability of correct decisions than in case of simple majority (or, in 
more political terms, to obtain a higher degree of legitimacy) qualified majorities 
are required for some decision making bodies to adopt particular acts. Examples 
may go from constitutional amendments in virtually all countries16 to the 
majority of competencies of the Council (of Ministers) of the European Union. 
The latter example turns our attention to the fact that the applicability of  
a qualified majority is sometimes accompanied by the casting of weighted votes. 
In the case of weighted voting, several measures of effective power are 
applicable. The first and simplest possibility of assessing a voter's influence is 
the elementary share of her vote (number of cast votes relative to the overall 
number of votes) compared to the shares of other voters. However, this measure 
does not allow for an objective appraisal of power during votes, when some 
coalitions may be formed. 
To overcome this flaw, power indices have been developed17. The basic 
idea underlying these indices is that the real voting power is implied by the 
possibility of being pivotal i.e. the situation when a voter’s membership in  
a coalition determines the result of voting (Banzhaf, 1965). Another way of 
assessing this impact is by measuring the marginal coalition pay off implied by 
the last voter entry into the coalition. These contributions are summed up for 
each player and result in the Shapley-Shubik power index. This index measures 
                                                 
13
 This is known as Condorcet's voting paradox, and was also presented in his 1785 seminal work. 
14
 This was shown originally by Black (1948). 
15
 See Barberà et al. (1993). 
16
 The author is not aware of any democratic state where constitutional amendments would 
require only a simple majority of votes. 
17
 For a more precise appraisal of the two most popular measures (viz. Banzhaf index and 
Shapley-Shubik index) see Banzhaf (1965) and Shapley (1997). For a recent comprehensive 
scrutiny of the subject, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) or Holler and Owen (2001). 
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the real voting power more precisely when coalitions are formed consciously, 
with communication among members18. 
The optimal weights ascribed to decision-makers depend on their abilities, 
as shown by Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997). Moreover, they show that the 
optimal decision rule also depends on these skills, as well as on prior factors 
with respect to the state of the world. These meaningful theoretical advances 
seem, however, of limited relevance to real-life decision making, as, firstly, 
objective assessment of decision-making skills is difficult, and secondly, 
weighing votes according to such a measure appears highly politically incorrect 
in the public domain. 
A decision rule which possibly has much more practical applications was 
proposed by Caplin and Nalebuff (1988). They show that under some plausible 
assumptions a qualified majority (supermajority) requiring 64% of votes leads to 
stable outcomes even in multi-dimensional decisions. 
Experimental studies and the role of psychology 
A remarkable research program - aimed at (indirect) verification of 
Condorcet's theorem and creating important liaisons between decision-making 
and psychology - is emerging and takes the form of experimental studies. 
Questions like how groups make policy-type decisions compared to individuals, 
or which kind of motivations may induced by different voting rules, are being 
raised and tested. An example of this type of research in the field has been 
presented by Marchese and Montefiori (2011). 
These authors compare how small committees deal with public choice 
problems (provision of a public good) under the mean and the median19 rule. 
Moreover, they try to distinguish between sincere and strategic behavior with 
and without information about other members' preferences20. The results of the 
experiment support the relative advantage of the mean over median rule (in 
terms of social welfare losses). 
Nevertheless, the setup of this experiment gives no explicit ex ante social 
optimum, and even if the players can infer it (it is supposed to be a simple mean 
of the three players), it has no weight assigned in their personal welfare 
functions. Moreover, there is no communication among voters. Thus the whole 
experiment incites to strategic and selfish behaviour on the part of participants 
(even if, probably due to some difficulties in finding the optimal strategy, some 
players chose to reveal their true preferences). 
                                                 
18
 See e.g. Widgrén (1994). 
19
 This obviously stylizes simple majority voting. See the remarks above on the median voter 
theorem. 
20
 Welfare functions are quadratic and thus one dimensional and single peaked. 
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The problem of the decision rule often emerges in the (general) context of 
international organizations. Maggi and Morelli (2006) focus on theoretical 
aspects of governance in such an environment, and more specifically concentrate 
on the implications of the lack of an external enforceability mechanism. This 
means that even after the collective adoption of a decision, it remains a country's 
sovereign decision whether to execute it or not. 
The authors analyze collective actions, which are undertaken by an 
international organization if a majority of its members (or all of them) agree. 
The decision rule is chosen ex ante, under the "veil of ignorance" on the future 
costs of actions (benefits are normalized to 1). These costs can be lower or 
higher (i.e. exceeding benefits) with a fixed and commonly known ex ante 
symmetric probability distribution. The authors also allow for the correlation of 
cost probabilities among countries. After observing their respective cost 
realizations (which are private information) countries simultaneously signal if 
they wish to participate in the common action (in opposition to the status quo). 
Then countries simultaneously choose their actions. "Pure" common actions are 
taken if all members participate21. 
The game is repeated once and decisions are taken on the basis of 
common expected utility. Thus some member countries may vote for a common 
action ex ante (and apply it) even if it may wind up not being beneficial for them 
ex post. In such a case the country must have incentives to comply with the 
previously taken decision. Such motivation is assured by the expected utility 
from future decisions. 
The two considered decision rules are unanimity and an "efficient" 
(qualified) majority, which is the optimal rule for a "one shot game" with 
enforcement (lowest majority assuring positive common ex ante utility)22. 
Depending on the discount factor (common to all governments), the optimal 
self-enforcing decision rule may be only one of these two. Thus, a majority is 
more probable in organizations taking frequent decisions (or with more stable 
governments), where the discount factor is higher. 
Some other important findings of Maggi and Morelli (2006) include the 
finding that a higher correlation among members' preferences (higher 
organization's homogeneity) implies that a majority rather than unanimity 
                                                 
21
 The authors analyze also "impure" common actions, which are implemented only by  
a subset of countries. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present dissertation, only "pure" 
common actions are taken into account, since the monetary decisions of the ECB always concern 
all countries participating in the euro area. 
22
 This "first best majority rule" depends on costs, benefits, and number of members. This 
makes the analysis especially interesting, because further parameters (discount factor, correlation 
etc.) do not influence it. 
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decision rule can improve welfare. This mechanism is based on the fact that in 
more homogeneous organizations future common actions are more probable and 
thus the expected value from cooperation is higher. Consequently, countries are 
more prone to accept instantaneous losses than rely on yield from future 
activities. This conforms to the real world observation, an example being the 
European Union, a relatively homogeneous organization, where more and more 
decisions are taken by majority rather than unanimity. 
Voting procedures, especially within international organizations, has also 
been considered in some less conventional ways. These alternative decision 
making scenarios include, for example, market mechanisms (Casella 2001) or 
possibilities of inter-temporal transmission of votes (Casella 2005). Although the 
first possibility was initially thought of as a market tool for such "goods" as 
budgetary deficit limits (such as the 3 percent threshold allowed by the Stability 
and Growth Pact) and based on American experience of pollution permits, the 
possibility of votes being traded might also be considered, and such an 
alternative is mentioned by the author, but rather as a possible by-product of 
storable votes. 
However, this setup relies on the somewhat controversial assumption that 
the public authorities are profit-maximizing. Another option is to allow for 
saving unused votes (when a decision-maker is relatively indifferent about the 
two alternatives being voted) and take advantage of them in an opportune 
moment (when a voter has a clear preference between the possible choices). The 
proposition of storable votes seem to be politically acceptable23 and, under some 
rather plausible assumptions such a solution may better the ex ante welfare24. 
This hypothesis has been successfully tested in an experiment presented in  
a companion paper by Casella et al. (2006). 
International organizations' voting schemes, without enforcing 
mechanisms, may be completed by Widgrén's (1999) vision of flexible 
integration being the equivalent of a decision rule. He analyses European 
Treaties as an incomplete contract, which sets rules for bargaining between two 
levels of governments – supranational and national ones. Moreover, national 
governments signing the treaty may differ from those which later take decisions 
under the treaty provisions. The author defines ex ante efficiency as the 
expectation to attain the preferred point of all local governments25, and ex post 
efficiency as an outcome which is Pareto-efficient. Other crucial definitions 
                                                 
23
 Although the author's plan to apply it to the ECB Governing Council might be difficult due 
to the status quo prevailing in its decisions as well as a tendency to consensus. 
24
 However, the author admits that some counterexamples may be found. 
25
 These are supposedly identical. 
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include common policy, which is the outcome adopted by all governments, and  
a flexible integration treaty, which requires a pre-defined majority to adopt  
a policy, but gives a possibility to minority members to apply an alternative 
outcome. In his analysis, Widgrén finds that there is a trade-off between ex ante 
and ex post efficiency if a common policy is to be applied in all states, and only 
flexible integration proves to be an adequate decision tool for overcoming this 
difficulty26.  
4. Internal features 
Modeling the internal characteristics of committees in general, without 
any information about their purposes, external framework, the information they 
process etc., seems difficult and even futile from some points of view. Thus, as 
mentioned in the previous section, some internal characteristics of committees 
are assumed, without being explicitly modeled (this is the case of a common 
objective or heterogeneity of decision-making skills). Nevertheless, some 
remarkable efforts in analyzing internal features, such as communication or 
seniority (order of speech) within a committee have been made and are 
presented below. 
Communication 
The possibility of communication and exchange of views is precisely one 
of the comparative advantages of the committee setup over individual decision 
making. The resulting information pool is believed to reduce incentives for 
strategic voting. Gerling et al. (2005) presents some important theoretical 
implications of the revelation of private information by committee members 
prior to voting. First, exchange of information before choosing alternatives may 
help attenuate the adverse effects of conflicting interests27. Second, also in  
a setup with communication, the optimal size of the committee is smaller when 
information becomes costly, which confirms the results above. Finally, by 
eliminating strategic behavior and sharing all available information, 
communication allows for the optimal decision to be taken by all the members 
and, thus, makes the decision rule irrelevant. The authors remark, however, that 
such a vision is probably exceedingly optimistic, as it also requires that decision-
makers share common objectives. Schulte (2010) completes this argument and 
                                                 
26
 This finding seems to offer a theoretical underpinning for a "multispeed Europe", which is, 
in fact, politically controversial, at least in some EU member states. 
27
 An in-depth analysis of conflicting and common interests in committees can be also found in 
Li et al. (2001). 
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proves that if the dissimilar preferences of committee members are known, the 
pre-voting communication allows for a perfect information aggregation and thus 
leads to more informed (and better) decisions.  
Another argument is given by Berk and Bierut (2009) is that, even if 
communication does provide an alternative to expanding the number of 
members of a monetary policy committee, it is the most efficient if the skills of 
the members (the probability that their individual decision would be correct) are 
relatively lower. 
Order of speech 
Important in-committee factors include the order of speech, which can be 
also connected to the role of agenda setter28, and which is not neutral with 
regards to the real (in contrast to nominal) power of a vote. In many committees 
the chairperson, besides having a tie-breaking power, is also the first to speak. 
This advantage of being primus inter pares may have some important 
implications, which have been modeled e.g. by Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001). 
In their model, votes (or private information revealing) are driven by reputation 
concerns. Thus less informed decision makers, if speaking after members who 
are believed to be better informed, tend to adhere to their opinion (i.e. vote for 
the same option), while ignoring their own signal. 
This setup, while suggesting the possibility of herding behavior, allows 
for some important insights. First, the authors show that an anti-seniority rule 
(less informed members speaking before those endowed with supposedly more 
exact information), which in principle eliminates herding, is not always optimal. 
This is true when a number of junior experts agree with an action, and when 
more expert ones do not dare reveal their true signal if they have doubts as to its 
accuracy. Second, when faced with a significant number of equally skilled 
members, the design of an optimal order of speaking becomes impossible. These 
two remarks suggest that, in a restrained and heterogeneous committee, devising 
the optimal voting (and communication) order may be easier, thus allowing for 
better aggregation of information.  
5. Conclusions 
This article presented a general view on the decision-making literature. 
Interestingly, an overwhelming majority of the issues discussed can be easily 
                                                 
28
 See e.g. Primo (2002) for a discussion of such a power implied by the possibility of offering 
the first proposal. 
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and directly translated into our external-internal factors analysis. Moreover, this 
literature provides some insights on important interactions among these issues, 
such as the relationship between committee size and the optimal decision rule, or 
the implications of communication and preferences on the decision rule. 
These general remarks are summarized in Table 1 below. It should be 
emphasized that they may be applied, and the scope of the analysis can be 
extended, to more specific aspects of committee decisions. Unsurprisingly, the 
problems presented will find their counterparts in the framework of monetary 
policy made by a committee, where much more analysis can be presented with 
respect to internal factors.  
Table 1. Main issues raised by the literature on collective decision making 
Question References Findings 
Committee 
or individual? 
Condorcet (1785) Committee, because the probability of a correct decision is higher 
Méon (2006) 
Committee, because the volatility of majority 
decisions is lower than committee members' 
preferred outcomes 
Optimal size 
Condorcet (1785) Unbounded 
Persico (2004) Bounded, if adding decision-makers is costly 
Koriyama and 
Szentes (2009) 
Bounded, but the inefficiency of an oversized 
committee is very limited compared to the 
inefficiency of too small a committee. 
Hahn (2012) Bounded, if decision-makers have career concerns 
and compete for an opportunity to speak.  
Decision-
making scheme 
– rotation 
Bosman et al. 
(2005) 
Rotation may increase the efficiency of decisions, at 
the cost of redistribution effects and strategic 
behavior. Unanimity outcome often overlaps with 
median voter's preferences 
Decision-
making rule 
Persico (2004) Optimal one depends on the quality of information. 
Unanimity is optimal only if the information is 
perfect. 
Black (1948) Simple majority favors median voter 
Ben-Yashar & 
Nitzan (1997) 
Optimal voters' weights depend on their abilities 
Caplin & Nalebuff 
(1988) 
64%-majority rule is optimal in multi-dimensional 
decision making 
Gerling et al. 
(2005) 
Unimportant, if information is perfect and the 
objective is common. Otherwise, unanimity is 
undesirable. 
Marchese & 
Montefiori (2005) 
Averaging of preferences is better than simple 
majority voting in provision of public goods 
Casella (2001 and 
2005) 
Storable or tradable votes may improve ex ante 
welfare 
Maggi & Morelli 
(2006) 
Lack of enforceability of decisions in international 
organizations justifies the frequent use of 
unanimity. Nevertheless, if preferences of voters are 
correlated (and/or the issue is of smaller 
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importance), unanimity is worse than other majority 
schemes. 
Widgrén (1999) Flexible integration is equivalent to an optimal 
decision rule. 
Communication 
and order of 
speech 
Ottaviani & 
Sorensen (2001) 
Optimal speech order depends on skills. 
 
Gerling et al. 
(2005) 
Communications makes conflicting interests 
irrelevant and lowers optimal committee size if 
information is costly. 
Schulte (2010) Communication allows for perfect information 
aggregation even if the preferences of committee 
members are heterogeneous (when these differences 
are of common knowledge). 
Source: own elaboration. 
Even if an analysis of the equally broad literature related to collective 
monetary policy-making represents the main proposed direction of further 
research, some preliminary conclusions can be reached. First, there are some 
strong arguments for delegating monetary policy to a committee (confirmed by 
the practice of most industrialized countries). Second, monetary policy 
committees should rather be restrained and decisions should be made by simple 
majority voting. Third, the heterogeneity of such a committee may be desirable, 
and should not pose any problems with efficient information aggregation. There 
are, however, some issues for which a more detailed investigation into the 
specific context of monetary policy is necessary. This includes the mechanisms 
for stabilizing the preferences and outcomes, such as optimal nomination design, 
overlapping terms of office, and the consequences of the composition of  
a monetary policy council for macroeconomic stability. 
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Streszczenie 
 
ASPEKTY TEORETYCZNE KOLEKTYWNEGO PODEJMOWANIA DECYZJI 
– PRZEGLĄD LITERATURY 
 
Artykuł ma na celu dokonanie przeglądu literatury ekonomicznej z zakresu 
kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji. W tym celu zaproponowano ramy pozwalające na 
ustrukturyzowaną analizę czynników wpływających na pracę organu kolektywnego 
(rady). Dokonano podziału tych czynników na zewnętrzne (tzn. kształtowane poza samą 
radą, np. przez wymogi prawne) oraz wewnętrzne (związane ze składem rady oraz 
interakcjami między jej członkami). Dokonany w ramach zaproponowanej struktury 
przegląd literatury ogólnoekonomicznej dotyczącej kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji 
pozwala na zaproponowanie interesujących kierunków dalszych badań, w tym 
konsekwencji dla kształtu rad polityki pieniężnej. 
. 
